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During the Cold War, U.S. and Soviet governments used puppet states and 
guerilla forces to conduct proxy wars.  Since that time, failing states and 
transnational actors continue emphasizing insurgency actions short of 
total war to gather popular support and replace existing governments.  
Counterinsurgency forces often tout government elections held within 
these states as a success metric.  Pathological Counterinsurgency explores 
the perceived links between election legitimacy and governmental power 
as well as how successful governance strategies aid counterinsurgency 
campaigns.  The research seeks to discover why happy, quiescent 
populations are less beneficial to insurgencies than villagers actively 
opposed to current governments.  Dr. Greene reviews political and 
democratization theories to show how the U.S’s foreign election 
manipulation during insurgency may appear as stabilization.  Each of the 
four case studies compare only internal governance examples during 
counterinsurgency periods without relating operational details of hunting 
down various insurgent miscreants as occurs in some other 
counterinsurgency texts.        
 
Greene’s core theory suggests elections, are insufficient to overcome 
governmental flaws and create lasting improvements.  Correlations 
between government actions, popular legitimacy, and non-rebellious 
countries forms the theory’s bedrock with background from how several 
counterinsurgent theorists felt about elections.  The literary review starts 
with Mao as employed by Van Thieu, Che Guevara, and Castro to 
emphasize how insurgencies meld with the populace.  During 
counterinsurgency planning, melding highlights why first actions increase 
the contextual distance between population and insurgent through either 
military force or fixing governance gaps like corruption, high taxes, and 
poor economic conditions.  Highlighted modern conflicts include 
transnational insurgents like Al Qaida and ISIS in their operations across 
national boundaries.  Overall three democratization theories are offered as 
strategies to improve compromised governments; minimalist through 
solely military support, deepening existing strengths, or full institutional 
rebuilds.    All examined elections are democratic and Greene sees a 
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reliance on elections as scoreboard for counterinsurgency success.  Each 
case study researches how elections may degrade legitimacy, showcase 
problems, or suffer external manipulation to different outcomes rather 
than simply trumpet success.        
 
The case studies begin with Vietnam as a classic counterinsurgency failure.  
Greene acknowledges the vast Vietnam War research available as a reason 
to limiting focus to the Ngo Dinh Diem 1955 and 1961elections and the 
General Nguyen Van Thieu elections 1965 and 1971.  Detrimental to the 
case for elections building legitimacy is Diem’s 1963 assassination by a US 
supported coup and Thieu fleeing Vietnam before Saigon’s 1975 fall.  
Diem’s failure to gain legitimacy leads to the US backed coup as well as a 
growing counter-insurgency.  Thieu’s first election appears as a U.S. 
success despite his identification as a “bottom of the barrel” candidate (p. 
76).  Theiu’s regime, like Diems, appears marked by corruption even 
during subsequent elections, again a poor sign for enhanced legitimacy.  In 
the end, the case concludes US inability to improve South Vietnam’s 
government legitimacy or performance directly contributes to 
counterinsurgency failure. 
 
Turning to El Salvador during the 1980s, the next study examines a 
potential counterinsurgency success.  This twelve-year conflict (1980-
1992) between the FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front) 
and the Salvadoran government often is cited as successful while Greene 
suggests these success areas are actually multiple failures generating an 
illusory credibility derived from corrupt elections, human rights abuses, 
and the government’s continued inability to deliver basic services.  These 
three factors are the same ones as previously cited for leading to 
government failures. El Salvador’s success from those elections is depicted 
as ignoring the oppressive, secret-police style techniques ensuring 
elections generated desired results and degrading overall legitimacy.  
While El Salvador appears better today, improvements in the text link 
more directly to elections a decade later as FMLN candidates integrate 
into the processes rather than any counter-insurgency gain.     
 
The final focus examines how election processes influenced, and are 
influencing, U.S. actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Always interesting 
during comparisons is when Iraq receives mention ahead and in greater 
proportion to Afghanistan despite U.S. efforts to aid Afghanistan occurring 
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both first and longer than Iraqi operations.  Studies show Iraq’s troop 
deployment levels were significantly higher than Afghanistan for several 
years but that top position switched in 2010 and has not changed since.   
Greene considers both operations as failures with neither holding a 
successful election nor defeating the insurgency while remaining troubled 
by unsteady governments.  However, both countries now face 
transnational insurgencies rather than those present during previous 
counterinsurgent campaigns and both installed governments have 
conducted multiple successful, and peaceful, power transfers each.  The 
two governments do, without doubt, face continued challenges from 
internal corruption, a record of human rights abuses, and an occasional 
inability to support their own population but all stability starts 
somewhere.  After all, comparing early U.S. history to Iraq, Washington’s 
first two terms probably were relatively unstable from an English 
perspective.   
 
Pathological Counterinsurgency was an enjoyable read about a difficult 
subject.  Unfortunately, the analytic areas remaining unexplained are the 
direct correlations between how flawed election policies link to 
counterinsurgency failures, one of the book’s main goals.  Greene carefully 
shows why legitimacy matters and where improved legitimacy enhances 
popular satisfaction to counteract insurgent feelings.  One can easily 
understand why a government more interested in bribes and engaging in 
text-only soldiers on pay rosters to supplement local leadership income 
probably has difficulty delivering infrastructure and basic services.  
Popular dissatisfaction then explains why those same individuals may 
shelter insurgents who promise more livable alternatives.  However, the 
direct correlation between which policies led to failed elections in each 
case and then how those factors lead to failed counterinsurgencies, 
although promised early on, does not appear in the case studies.  Each 
case study explains why failing internal policies prevent independent 
elections from curing any of a nation’s ills including insurgency.  If Dr. 
Greene had taken one more step to reach the titular expectations and draw 
either an anecdotal or metric analysis for how those failed elections also 
resulted in failed counterinsurgency efforts, the text’s overall impact would 
have improved dramatically.    
 
Overall, I enjoyed the case studies and the carefully built logic around 
governance and legitimization practices in the various failed states during 
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insurgency challenges.  The comparison between past and recent conflicts 
identifies the challenging problem in linking military strategies to Whole 
of Government effects required for today’s interdependent world.  The 
modern tendency to jointly employ diplomatic, information, military, and 
economic actions is the much improved over historic practices but will 
require significant data to hone those desired tools.  Green’s book makes a 
useful read for either policy or insurgency experts dealing with building 
and sustaining election practices but the lack of any direct correlation 
between counterinsurgency efforts and election strategies prevents 
Pathological Counterinsurgency from offering any prescriptions for 
improved future performances.     
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